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COMMENTS
TORTIOUS ACT AS A BASIS FOR JURISDICTION IN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently it was very difficult for a plaintiff to bring an out-of-state
manufacturer into New York to defend injury claims occasioned by his
faulty products.' The defendant manufacturer often found himself in the
pleasant position of being able to claim that although he had distributed his
product into the area, he had not "done business" 2 in the forum state. Hence,
he was not subject to the jurisdiction of New York courts. Complaints were
regularly dismissed on this basis.3
The underlying inequity behind such dismissals is that modern marketing
methods often involve numerous, scattered, independent assemblers and whole-
salers and, frequently, distribution on a nationwide scale without regard for
state boundaries. 4 Yet, courts have construed these same boundaries to be
barriers when any attempt has been made to acquire jurisdiction over the foreign
manufacturers. Thus, they have been able to send their products into the
stream of interstate commerce while remaining suit-proof beyond New York's
borders.
Suppose, for example, a Michigan corporation manufactures a safety device
for an electric scaffold and then sells this component to a scaffold assembler in
New Jersey. The New Jersey company sells the scaffolds to maintenance
concerns to be used in washing the "glass walls" of New York City sky-
scrapers. While the scaffold is being used, the safety device fails, killing a
workman, and suit is brought in New York against the Michigan corporation.
Is it unfair to bring the Michigan corporation to trial in the area into which
its product was distributed and caused injury?3
Prior to the enactment of Section 302 (a) (2) of the New York Civil Practice
Law and Rules (hereinafter referred to as CPLR)G the complaint against the
1. The plaintiffs burden has been considerably eased with the enactment of the N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Law & R. 302(a)(2) on September 1, 1963.
2. Under the "Tauza" rule a foreign corporation had to be "doing busine:" within
the state before the New York courts could subject it to personal jurisdiction of the state.
Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
3. Numerous examples can be found in 19 Clark's Digest Annotator § 34:31.49.
4. "Of the hundred major metropolitan markets in the United States, eighteen are
inherently interstate in character because of population in two or more states. At least
thirty-one more of these markets are located within thirty miles of state boundaries so
that news media which service them are interstate in character. Of the remaining fifty-one
major markets, only a few are located where there is little possibility of an advertisement
placed with media in the market being distributed to a neighboring state." Note, 33 Ind.
L.J. 455, 457 (1963) (Footnotes omitted.)
5. See Johnson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 22 App. Div. 2d
13S, 254 N.Y.S.2d 253 (1st Dep't 1964).
6. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & R. 302 reads as follows:
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Michigan corporation would have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Since
enactment, however, the appellate division has unanimously affirmed the
denial of a motion to dismiss on precisely these facts, and, thus, has recognized
the increased latitude granted to the courts of this state in acquiring jurisdiction
over foreign manufacturers who commit "tortious acts"17 within the state.
Why is it so important that the trial be held in the state in which the tortious
act occurred? The plaintiff received the goods in the forum state and generally
has no interests beyond the forum. To expect a New York resident, for
example, to travel to Michigan to bring suit involves transportation expenses
for himself and his witnesses which might well deprive him of the fruits of
his suit.8 Further, the forum state has a substantial interest in the outcome
of the trial, especially in actions involving personal injury or property damage,
where a losing plaintiff might thereafter be unable to support himself and
become a ward of the state.9 On the other hand, since the manufacturer,
albeit indirectly, channels goods into the forum state, be should be prepared
to defend suits in the areas into which his goods are directed.
II. SUPREME COURT HISTORY
The nineteenth century concept of jurisdiction, both as to individuals and
corporations, was that a state's power over a person existed only so long as he
was within the state's borders.1 A state could seize only those physically
Personal jurisdiction by acts of non-domiciliaries
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. A court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over any non-domiciliary, or his executor or administrator, as to a cause of action arising
from any of the acts enumerated in this section, in the same manner as if he were a
domiciliary of the state, if, in person or through an agent, he:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defama-
tion of character arising from the act; or
3. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.
(b) Effect of appearance. Where personal jurisdiction is based solely upon this section, an ap-
pearance does not confer such jurisdiction with respect to causes of action not arising
from an act enumerated in this section.
Notice requirements have also been liberalized. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & R. 313.
7. As to what constitutes a "tortious act," see text accompanying notes 153-66 infra.
8. In breach of warranty actions, witnesses would be located in the state where the ac-
cident occurred, since due care is not an issue. In a negligence action, witnesses would
be both at the situs where the accident occurred and at the situs of manufacture. See
Atkins v. Jones & Loughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960).
9. Moreover, where the forum state has an interest in the case, as, for example, when
the injury occurs in that state, the forum state's law will generally apply. See Currie,
The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Func-
tion, 26 U. Chi. L. Rev. 9, 12-14, 66-71 (1958); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 377
(1934); Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws § 84 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956); Restate-
ment (Second), Conflict of Laws § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964).
10. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839) (dictum); see Mc-
Donald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917). Common law procedure lies behind this restriction.
At common law, subsequent to the issuance of a proper writ, service of a summons upon
the defendant was required. Failure to comply with the summons resulted in an attach-
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present within its territory," and jurisdiction went hand in hand with the
state's ability to seize."-
A. Jurisdiction Over Individuals
Until the early 1900's, when the mobility of the population increased through
widespread use of the automobile, the problem of gaining jurisdiction over
individuals was not pressing enough to require the reshaping of traditional
jurisdictional concepts.13 A nonresident could enter, commit an act within a
state, leave never to return, and be completely immune from suit in that
state.' 4 Even if an agent were found within the state, jurisdiction could not
be gained over his principal. 15
B. Jurisdiction Over Corporations
Even during the nineteenth century, corporations had begun taking on a
national character with greater mobility and far more widespread effects than
individuals. For example, a railroad incorporated in Missouri might have tracks
throughout the country. Accidents could occur in any number of states. Yet,
jurisdiction over the corporation was traditionally limited to the state of its
incorporation. 16 States, therefore, began to require as a condition of doing any
ment of any of defendant's goods in the jurisdiction. In the absence of such goods and
in case service could not be effected upon defendant, the writ of capias would be issued,
subjecting defendant to outlawry and bodily seizure if found w:ithin the juricdiction by
the county sheriff. See Barry, Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents, 13 Va. L. Rev. 175, 178-O8
(1927).
11. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
12. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917); see Kurland, The Supreme Court,
The Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 569, 578-S6 (1958); Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresidents Doing Businecs Within
a State, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871 (1919).
13. This fact is evidenced by the steadily increasing tempo of articles after 1905 dealing
with service on nonresidents, many of which are cited in Barry, supra note 10, at 175
n.a. The first nonresident motorist statute was passed by New Jersey, N.J. Laws 1903,
at 613, and construed in Kane v. State, S1 N.J.L. 594, E0 Atl. 453 (Ct. Err. & App. 1911),
aff'd, 242 U.S. 160 (1916). This statute authorized New Jersey to compel nonreldent mo-
torists to sign certificates appointing the New Jersey Secretary of State as his agent for Eer-
vice of process as a condition to using New Jersey highways. A later New Jersey Statute,
N.J. Laws 1924, ch. 232, was one of the first based on implied consent to appointment. See
Scott, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorists, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 563 (1926).
14. Knowles v. The Gaslight & Coke Co., 86 US. (19 Wall.) 53 (1373). For an extensive
listing of articles discussing the development of this point of law up to 1927, see Barry, supra
note 10, at 175 n.a.
15. Compare Flexner v. Farson, 243 U.S. 2S9 (1919), vith Henry L. Doherty & Co.
v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935) and Nelson v. Miller, 11 311. 2d 373, 143 N.E.2d 673
(1957).
16. Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915); Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205
U.S. 530 (1907); see Kurland, supra note 12, at 57S-S6. One notable exception which
allowed service of a corporation in the absence of an appointed agent was Moulin v.
Trenton Mut. Life & Fire Ins. Co., 25 N.J.L. 57 (Sup. CL 1355).
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business within their borders that a corporation appoint a registered agent within
the state and consent to be sued on any cause of action, whether related to
its business transactions there or not, 17 even if the cause of action did not
arise within the state.' 8 Noncompliance with the condition of appointment was
held to mean that the corporation was subject to suit on an implied consent
theory.19
This solution brought its own problems. For one, since a corporation supposedly
did not exist beyond the borders of the state of its incorporation, allowing it
to sue or be sued in a foreign state was an anomaly. 20 For another, a corporation
refusing such express consent would be in a far better position than one complying
with the various state statutes. That is, the "outlaw" corporation could be
sued only on causes of action related to its business dealings within the
state, whereas a foreign corporation which expressly consented was also liable
for unrelated causes of action. 2 1
To cure this defect the "presence" theory was developed. It sustained
jurisdiction over corporations for acts outside the forum state,2 2 even where
service was made upon an agent other than the one designated by statute."
17. N.Y. Sess. Law 1855, ch. 279, § 1, is an example of this requirement. An even earlier
illustration can be found in Md. Laws 1834, ch. 89. This method was approved in 1855
in Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855).
18. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
These statutes were broadly construed. See Cahill, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations
and Individuals Who Carry on Business Within the Territory, 30 Harv. L. Rev. 676,
691-92 (1917).
19. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855). Mr. justice Curtis
reasoned that a state had control over activities within its boundaries. If a foreign corpo-
ration (in this case an insurance company) wished to send agents into the state for the
purpose of transacting business there, it could be subjected to control by that state even
in the absence of express consent. Id. at 408; see Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915);
St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 350, 356 (1882). A corporation which failed
to appoint an agent but nevertheless carried on business within the state was deemed
to have impliedly designated a public official as its representative for service on a cause
of action related to the transaction of business within the state. For example, N.Y. Civil
Practice Act Annotated § 229 (Gilbert-Bliss 1942) designated New York's Secretary of
State as the proper official for such service.
20. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
21. For a collection of cases see 1 Beale, The Conflict of Laws 377 n.2 (1935). Judge
Learned Hand noted this discrepancy and urged a change which would bring about a
greater equality between corporations conforming to the law and "outlaw" corporations.
Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 222 Fed. 148, 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1915),
cited with approval by Mr. Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue
Mining and Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917); see Kurland, supra note 12, at 578-81.
22. The necessity of an appearance by the defendant or of personal service within the
jurisdiction in order to give the forum in personam jurisdiction was illustrated in Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 741 (1877) ; see St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. (16 Otto) 350 (1882).
23. International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
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In essence, presence meant that a corporation had to be transacting business
in a systematic manner within the forum state.2-4
C. Single Act as a Basis for Jurisdiction
Thus, by 1927, through fictions of implied consent and presence, corporations
were subject to suit in a foreign state provided they had "transacted business"
within the state. Corporations were not, without express consent, subject to
suit in a foreign state on the basis of a single act or isolated occurrences. -z
Furthermore, individuals were not considered to fall within the implied
consent test before Hess v. Pawloski.2 0 Nor were they subject to jurisdiction
on the basis of a single act. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Hess held that
in at least one situation jurisdiction could be based on the commission of a
single act by a nonresident within the state.
1. Hess v. Pauloski
Massachusetts had a nonresident motor vehicle statute2 7 which authorized
substituted service or process upon a nonresident involved in a collision in
Massachusetts. A public official was designated to receive process. The
plaintiff also was required to mail service and a copy of the process to the
defendant 2s The Supreme Court held:
24. See note 22 supra; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, supra note 23; Kurland,
supra note 12, at 5S3-SS. The presence test was more limited than the consent theory in
that a corporation which left the state prior to suit was not held to be amenable to the
jurisdiction of the state for acts done before departure. Chipman, Ltd. v. Thomas B.
Jeffery Co., 251 U.S. 373 (1920).
25. Cannon lfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 US. 333 (1925); Bank of America
v. Whitney Cent. Nat'l Bank, 261 U.S. 171 (1923); Rosenberg Bros. v. Curtis Brown Co.,
260 U.S. 516 (1923). But see MlcGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 US. 220 (1957).
26. 274 U.S. 352 (1927). In Flexner v. Farson, 24S US. 2S9 (1919), the Supreme Court
held that implied consent could not be stretched to include individuals transcting buinezs
within a state, but it was practically overruled by the Court, relying on Hez, in Henry
L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 62S (1935). The basis for the Court's
reasoning before Hess was that even though a state could exclude a foregn corporation
from its territorial boundaries, a state could not exclude an individual became individuals
were deemed protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The privileges and immunities clause guaranteed only to natural perons, not to
corporations, the right to transact business in any state. The doctrine of implied consent
was based on a state's ability to exclude corporations. Since this ability to exclude did
not extend to individuals, neither did the doctrine.
27. Mlass. Gen. Laws ch. 90, as amended, lass. Stat. ch. 431, § 2 (1923). See Scott,
supra note 13.
28. Two cases paved the way for Hess v. Pawloski, 274 US. 352 (1927). In Hendrick
v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915), the Supreme Court held that a state had the pov,'Cr
to regulate the use of its highways even as to nonresidents. In Kane v. New Jers ey, 242
U.S. 160 (1916), the Court upheld a New Jersey statute authorizing actual appointment
of an official (as distinguished from Hess which authorized implied appointment) before
the nonresident's use of the New Jersey highways.
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In the public interest the State may make and enforce regulations reasonably calcu-
lated to promote care on the part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who use
its highways. . . . Under the statute the implied consent is limited to proceedings
growing out of accidents or collisions on a highway in which the non-resident may
be involved.2 9
Mr. Justice Butler's language in Hess, couched as it was in nineteenth
century terms such as "implied consent," was not nearly as significant as the
doors it opened. His decision allowed expansion of the jurisdiction of
Massachusetts to include a nonresident who had committed but one act within
the state-an automobile collision. The Court relied on the state's interest
in that one act.30
The Hess decision was the result of many states' attempts to control auto-
mobile travel within their borders,81 and followed the suggestions of an ever-
increasing number of writers that nonresident motorist statutes were a logical
way to cope with the problems caused by nonresidents over whom jurisdiction
could not otherwise be effectively obtained. 32
Hess, the first case which allowed jurisdiction on the basis of a single act,
was the result of technological change. With additional changes came an
increasingly complex society and there inevitably followed other statutes to
cope with the changes.33
2. International Shoe Co. v. Washington
The case which clearly spelled out the rationale upon which single act
jurisdiction should rest was International Shoe Co. v. Washington."4 The
29. 274 U.S. at 356.
30. Cf. Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338 (1953); Nelson v. Miller, 11 I1.
2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
31. By 1925 Connecticut, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Wisconsin had statutes
similar to the one in Massachusetts. See generally Scott, supra note 13, at 564. New York
passed a nonresident motor vehicle statute, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1928, ch. 465, § 1, one year after
Hess v. Pawloski.
32. E.g., Scott, supra note 13.
33. Justice Schaefer, in Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957), pointed
out in referring to Hess v. Pawloski that "the social problems resulting from automobile
accidents, or as in Doherty from the sale of securities, may be of greater magnitude
than those resulting from other tortious conduct generally; but the determination that
the degree of need is such as to call for remedy is to be made by the legislature, not by
the courts." Id. at 389, 143 N.E.2d at 679. (Italics omitted.) This approach was relied upon
by Mr. Justice Black in his concurring opinion in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 322-26 (1945), and by Cardozo, The Reach of the Legislature and the Grasp of
Jurisdiction, 43 Cornell L.Q. 210 (1957), and questioned in both Erlanger Mills, Inc. v.
Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956), and Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State
Courts Over Non-Residents in Our Federal System, 43 Cornell L.Q. 196 (1957).
34. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe established that the transaction of business
within the state is a sufficient predicate for personal jurisdiction at least as to causes of
action arising out of that business. See Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281,
200 N.E.2d 427, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964). It is interesting to note that N.Y. Civ. Prac.
Law & R. 302(a) (1) and 302(a) (2) often become intertwined. For example, where a
International Shoe Company was not doing business in the State of Washington
in the traditional sense of the term. Yet, its contacts were considered substan-
tial. 33 Mr. Justice Stone, writing for the Court, reassessed the value of dealing
with fictions where the real test was reasonableness.
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on
their de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally
binding him.... But now that the capias ad respondcndunz:  has given way to per-
sonal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only that in
order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present vithin
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice . .. .37
Whether due process is satisfied must depend.., upon the quality and nature of the
activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws v.hich it was the
purpose of the due process clause to insure.3 1
Hence, a flexible standard,39 taking into account the nature of the activity,
whether the suit arose from the activity,40 whether the activity was frequent
or isolated,4 ' and whether the state had a need to exercise jurisdiction 2 was
formulated.
The state's interest can be discerned from the existence of a statute covering
the subject matter. For example, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co.,43 a New York statute which empowered New York courts to entertain a
corporation actually sends an agent into a jurisdiction to transact busines and that agnt
commits a tortious act there, jurisdiction could be grounded on either the transaction of
business section, subdivision (1), or the tortious act section, subdivision (2). As a practical
matter, the transaction of business section would be more feasible since the law is more
dearly defined in this area. However, if a tortious act can be dearly shown from the
activities of the nonresident (which activities may or may not constitute a transaction
of business), it might well be more practical to move under the tortious act section, thus
alleviating the evidentiary problem of pro%ing a transaction of business and also gaining the
advantage of the wider latitude of section 302(a)(2).
35. These contacts, as found by the Court, were: (a) there were thirtecn alezmen
physically present within Washington who were paid commissions based on their volume
of sales within the state; (b) such commissions for each year were in escez5 of $31,CZ;
(c) the salesmen periodically rented office space for the purpose of displaying their goods;
and (d) the salesmen solicited business within the forum state. 326 U.S. at 313-14; see
Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction,
44 Iowa L. Rev. 249 (1959).
36. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
37. 326 U.S. at 316.
3S. Id. at 319.
39. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1953); Reese & Galston, supra note 35.
40. 326 U.S. at 319.
41. Id. at 320.
42. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 343 US. 66 (1954); Mullane v. Central




suit for accounting by the trustee of a trust established under New York law,
against nonresident beneficiaries, was said to be constitutional. The statute
permitted the acquisition of jurisdiction over the beneficiaries based on service
outside the state. The Supreme Court felt that the state's interest in settling
the affairs of its trusts was pressing enough to allow New York to gain what
could amount to in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents in order to adjudicate
matters concerning common trusts in the state.44
Where a Virginia Blue Sky Law4r subjected any insurance company failing
to comply with its provisions of filing to suit and to a cease and desist order
in Virginia courts, the Supreme Court held in Travelers Health Ass'n v.
Virginia,46 that although the acts of petitioner were outside the state, Virginia
had the power to protect its citizens from the consequences of such acts. Although
the contacts in this case were quite substantial in that 800 policyholders lived in
Virginia, the essential element in this decision, as in Mullane, was Virginia's
interest in protecting its citizens.
III. THE SINGLE ACT STATUTE
Statutes using the language "tortious act" exist in seven states47 besides
New York, and analogous statutes, basing jurisdiction on a single tort (e.g.,
tort in whole or in part) exist in several others. 48
44. While the Supreme Court reversed on the ground that it would be unconstitutional
to serve by publication where the addresses of the beneficiaries were known, 339 U.S.
at 318-19, Mr. Justice Jackson stated, for the Court, that service outside the state by
mail was constitutional. Also, service by publication was held constitutional where the
addresses of those to be served were not known. Id. at 317.
45. Va. Acts 1928, ch. 529, at 1373, as amended, Va. Acts 1932, ch. 236, at 434 (now
Va. Code Ann. §§ 13.1-111).
46. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
47. Other states having "tortious act" statutes are: Idaho, Idaho Code Ann. § 5-514
(Supp. 1961); Illinois, Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1963); Kansas, Laws of
Kansas 1963, ch. 303, § 60-308; Maine, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 203, § 704 (1964); Montana,
Mont. R. Civ. P. 4(b); New Mexico, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-16 (Supp. 1963); Washington,
Wash. Rev. Code § 4.28.185 (1963).
48. Connecticut, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-41(c)(4) (1960); Iowa, Iowa Code Ann.
§ 617.3(1)(3) (Supp. 1962); Michigan, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§ 27A.705, 27A.715, 27A.725,
27A.735 (1962); Minnesota, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 303.13(3) (Supp. 1964); Missouri, Mo.
Ann. Stat. § 355.375(2) (1964); North Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-145(4) (1965);
Texas, Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 2031(b)(4) (Supp. 1960); Vermont, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12,
§ 855 (1959); West Virginia, W. Va. Code Ann. § 3080 (Supp. 1961). In Wisconsin, although
the Illinois basic form was copied, the legislature enacted a more elaborate statute, proba-
bly the most comprehensive single act statute in the country. Wvis. Stat. Ann. § 262.05(3) (4)
(Supp. 1962).
In some states where no "single act" statutes exist, other statutes such as substituted-
service acts and so-called "doing business" statutes, have sometimes been interpreted to
take advantage of the International Shoe minimum contacts test. E.g., California, Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code § 1018; Gordon Armstrong Co. v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 211,
325 P.2d 21 (1958); Eclipse Fuel Eng'r Co. v. Superior Court, 148 Cal. App. 2d 736, 307
[Vol. 33
A. Early Single Act Statutes
1. Generally
Maryland, 4 9 Vermont,' and Illinois5' were among the first states to have
their legislatures enact, and their courts construe, broad single act statutes.
An excellent example of the attitude of the lower courts in those states after
1945 is Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Prods. Co.52 In that case a federal
district court was faced with a negligence suit against two out-of-state manufac-
turers neither of which was found to have "done business" in the traditional
sense of the term. 3 Maryland had a 1937 single act statute, apparently the
first of its kind in the country.. 4 Judge Chesnut decided that one of the
defendant corporations, which had sent into the state an agent who actually
contracted with plaintiff's employer and solicited the sale of machinery, part
of which was the defective grinding wheel in question, had committed an act
under the Maryland statute which subjected it to suit in Maryland. The
cause of action was deemed to have arisen from the corporation's business
dealings within Maryland, but the main question was whether application of
the statute would be a denial of due process?. The court held that, based on
the convenience and sufficient contacts tests laid dovm in International Shoe, this
application of the statute would not violate the fourteenth amendment.
My conclusion of law is that these circumstances make it just and not unreasonable
to require the foreign corporation to defend the suit here in the absence of further
facts which would indicate the great relative inconvenience to the defendant. 0
Similarly, Vermont had a statute, passed in 1947, r which provided that if
a foreign corporation committed a tort in Vermont, it would be subject to suit
in the state by service upon the Secretary of State. In 1951, in Smyth v. Twin
State Improvement Corp.,5 s a foreign corporation which had negligently
reroofed a house claimed the statute was in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Supreme Court of Vermont held that since International Shoe,
P.2d 739 (1957); Massachusetts, Mass. Ann. Laws dh. 1sl, § 3A (Supp. 1963); Zucco v.
Dobeckmun Co., 152 F. Supp. 369 (D. Mass. 1957); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-1Z01
(1962); Carter v. American Bus Lines, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 460 (D. Neb. 1959); Newv Hamp-
shire, N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 300:11 (1955); W. H. Elliott & Sons v. Nuoder Co., 243
F.2d 116 (1st Cir. 1957); Oklahoma, Okla. Stat. Ann. it. 13, § 1.17(d) (Supp. 1964); S.
Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655 (1954), appeal dismisszed, 343 U.S. 933 (1955).
49. Md. Laws 1937, ch. 504, § 113(d) (1937) (now Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 92(d)
(1957)).
50. Vt. Stat. 1947, § 1562 (now Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 855 (1959)).
51. El1. Laws 1955, at 223S, 2245-46 (now Mll. Ann. Stat. ch. 10, § 17 (Smith-Hurd
1963)).
52. 89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950).
53. Id. at 660.
54. Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 92(d) (1957).
55. 89 F. Supp. at 662.
56. Id. at 663.
57. Vt. Stat. Ann. it. 12, § 355 (1959).
5S. 116 VL 569, so A.2d 664 (1951).
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one act was sufficient to subject a foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of
Vermont under its statute, provided the nature and quality of the act was
such that it was reasonable to subject the corporation to suit there.
Justice Blackmer, writing for a unanimous court, recognized that the Supreme
Court's criteria were general, at best.
We are of the opinion that the United States Supreme Court has left undecided
whether isolated tortious activity could result in a proper subjection of a foreign
corporation to suit in the forum when the cause of action arose out of that activity;
no generally applicable standards can be ascertained from the decisions beyond the
statements in the International Shoe case .... "
Using those same statements, and finding that a contract bad been made
within the state and that a foreign corporation's agents had gone into Maryland,
a majority of the Maryland Court of Appeals in Compania de Astral, S.A. v.
Boston Metals Co.60 held that whether there was a contract or a tort, Mary-
land's statute6 ' would apply and the exercise of jurisdiction 2 would not be
unconstitutional.
Mr. Justice Black, writing for the Supreme Court, substantiated this view in
Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 3 and gave persuasive reasons for
the existence of a statute specifically covering the acquisition of jurisdiction
over defendants potentially liable to injured persons.
Louisiana's direct action statute is not a mere intermeddling in affairs beyond her
boundaries which are no concern of hers. Persons injured or killed in Louisiana are
most likely to be Louisiana residents, and even if not, Louisiana may have to care for
them.... Louisiana has manifested its natural interest in the injured by providing reme-
dies for recovery of damages. It has a similar interest in policies of insurance which are
designed to assure ultimate payment of such damages. Moreover, Louisiana courts in
most instances provide the most convenient forum for trial of these cases. . . . In
this case efforts to serve the Gillette Company were answered by a motion to dismiss
on the ground that Gillette had no Louisiana agent on whom process could be served.
If this motion is granted, Mrs. Watson, but for the direct action law, could not get
her case tried without going to Massachusetts or Illinois although she lives in Louisiana
and her claim is for injuries from a product bought and used there. What has been
said is enough to show Louisiana's legitimate interest in safeguarding the rights of
persons injured there. In view of that interest, the direct action provisions here chal-
lenged do not violate due process. 64
The Joint Committee Comments6 5 following the Illinois single act statute 0
59. Id. at 573, 80 A.2d at 666.
60. 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
61. Md. Ann. Code art. 23, § 92(d) (1957).
62. The majority was apparently correct. This case was cited with approval in McGee v.
International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 n.2 (1957).
63. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
64. Id. at 72-73.
65. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956), reprinted and appended to the
Second Preliminary Report of the New York Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure,
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 12, at 469 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Second Preliminary Report].
66. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956).
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cite both Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp.7 and Compania de Astral,
S.A. v. Boston Metals Co.03 The Illinois historical and practice notescs emphasize
that this is a new area and that "while the Court's language is admittedly
confined to bodily injury actions, its philosophy70°that a state may provide a
means by which its citizens may bring the non-resident transgressor to book-
is applicable to all tort actions."' 7'
This reasoning seems justified under the Watson case, and has been bome
out by later Supreme Court and state court decisions. Thus, the simple words
"the commission of a tortious act within this state" were designed to give
Illinois the same type of protection over such areas as products liability that
the nonresident motor vehicle statute had given a number of states, thirty years
before, in the automobile field.72
2. New York
Attempts were made toward a broad expansion of New York's jurisdictional
power in 1944, and again in 1945, but the 1944 bill was withdrawn to study
criticisms73 and the 1945 bill was not approved by the Governor. 4 Their
purpose was to confer jurisdiction over corporations which committed acts, not
amounting to transaction of business, from which a cause of action arose.5
In 1945, spurred by federal law,70 Section 59(a) of New York Insurance Law
was enacted 77 to enable New York to gain jurisdiction over an insurance com-
pany that merely solicits in this state. New York's arsenal of single act statutes
was thus broadened from specific laws on motor vehicles,78 airplanes,)7 boatsF
67. 116 Vt. 569, So A.2d 664 (1951).
63. 205 Ald. 237, 107 A.2d 357 (1954), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 943 (1955).
69. Jenner & Tone, in Second Preliminary Report 471.
70. Referring to Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 34S U.S. 66 (1954).
71. Jenner & Tone, Second Preliminary Report 475. See Currie, The Growth of the
Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. Ill. L.F. 533, 533.
72. A full discussion of the need for legislation such as the Illinois "single act" statute
can be found in Nelson v. Miller, 11 111. 2d 373, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
73. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65L (1944).
74. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65B (1945). This proposal, as well as N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65.L
(1944), sought to expand jurisdiction solely over foreign corporations and was the prede-
cessor of the 1959 New York Law Revision Commission Report by Profezor Ree e
reiterating the need for an expanded "single act" statute. 1959 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n
Rep. 69 (discussing proposed amendment to N.Y. Civil Practice Act § 229-a (Gilbert-BILs
1942)).
75. See N.Y. Civil Practice Act § 229 (Gilbert-Bliss 1942).
76. Act of March 9, 1945, 59 Stat. 33, 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1958).
77. See N.Y. Ins. Law § 59(a).
73. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 253, 254.
79. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 250, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1952, ch. 74S, was formerly concerned
with accidents arising from the operation of airplanes within or without the state, so long
as the flight originated or terminated in New York. The statute, as phrased, vwas unanimously
held unconstitutional in Peters v. Robin Airlines, 231 App. Div. 903, 120 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2d
Dep't 1953) (memorandum decision). The present § 250 is applicable only to accidents occur-
ring in New York.
So. N.Y. Nay. Law § 74.
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workmen's compensation, 8' banking,82 and limited statutes of service of foreign
corporations, 8 3 all requiring an act within this state, to an insurance law which
was based on a mere consequence within New York rather than physical presence
of the actor or his agent.8 4 The present tortious act section, CPLR 302 (a) (2), is
not directly related to the motor vehicle statute since "tortious act" can be ap-
plied to consequences occurring in this state from acts performed elsewhere. In
this sense it more closely resembles the insurance statute. Jurisdiction based upon
single act statutes should be considered to have become a test of convenience
of the parties and interest of the state as a result of International Shoe, and
New York statute8 6 to have been designed to make suit possible in New York
whenever this convenience and interest dictate New York to be the better forum.
B. Constitutional Limitations Upon the Single Act Statute
1. McGee: A Liberal Approach
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,8 7 decided in 1957, is the most recent
Supreme Court case to expand a state's powers over a nonresident defendant.
Although the defendant never physically entered the state, Mr. Justice Black,
writing for a unanimous Court, held that it was reasonable that the trial held
in California should bind the defendant. Three factors influenced this finding.
First, California's manifest interest was expressed in its comprehensive insurance
statute,8 8 providing an effective means of redress for residents when their
insurers refuse to pay claims. Without this statutory aid an insured could find
himself unable to pursue a small claim, and the insurer could remain judgment
proof because of the expense involved in a foreign litigation.89 Whether redress
81. N.Y. Workmen's Comp. Law § 150-a.
82. N.Y. Banking Law § 200(3).
83. See note 75 supra.
84. N.Y. Ins. Law § 59(a).
85. See text accompanying note 150 infra.
86. Its predecessors were similarly designed. See N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65L (1944); N.Y.
Leg. Doc. No. 65B (1945); 1959 N.Y. Law Rev. Comm'n Rep. 71.
87. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
88. Cal. Ins. Code § 1611:
Acts constituting commissioner's appointment. The acts referred to in Section 1610 are:
(1) The issuance or delivery to residents of ... this State of contracts of insurance insuring
(a) the lives or persons of residents of this State physically present herein at the time of
such issuance or delivery or (b) property or operations located in this State. (2) The
solicitation of applications for such contracts. (3) The collection of premiums, membership
fees, assessments or other considerations for such contracts. (4) Any other transaction of
business arising out of such contracts.
See text accompanying notes 106-110 infra.
89. 355 U.S. at 223. The Court cited S. Howes Co. v. W. P. Milling Co., 277 P.2d 655
(Okla. 1954), Compania de Astral, SA. v. Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357
(1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955), and Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp.,
116 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664 (1951) as state court cases where a statute existed and juris-
diction over the defendant for the commission of a single act was upheld. 355 U.S. at 223 n.2.
In Trippe Mfg. Co. v. Spencer Gifts Inc., 270 F.2d 821, 822 (7th Cir. 1959), the court
stated in dictum that McGee was limited to insurance. Contra, Wisconsin Metal & Chem.
Corp. v. DeZurik Corp., 222 F. Supp. 119, 123 (E.D. Wis. 1963). The reiteration of the
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was effective would depend upon a consideration of the burdens which would
be placed upon the plaintiff were suit to be brought in Texas. Such burdens
included the expenses plaintiff would incur in traveling to Texas to sue and in
transporting his witnesses from California, where they were located, to Texas
for the trial. Second, the insurance company could foresee that its acts in Texas
would have consequences in California. Defendant mailed a reinsurance certifi-
cate to insured and possibly accepted premiums mailed from California."° Third,
the forum was not so inconvenient as to impose a burden upon defendant such
that it would be denied due process, since witnesses for its defense of suicide
were located in California.
Mr. Justice Black summed up the situation by discussing the trend toward
expansion of the states' jurisdictional powers:
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly discernible tomard
expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and
other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of
our national economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch vfo
or more States and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this
increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of
business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modem transportation
and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend
himself in a State where he engages in economic activity.0 1
2. Hazson: A Restrictive Approach
Less than a year after McGee, the Supreme Court decided Hanson v.
Denckla 2 in which the Court stated that although states could increase their
jurisdictional powers, definite limitations to such increase still existed. In
Hanson the setflor, a domiciliary of Pennsylvania, executed an inter vivos
trust naming a Delaware trust company as trustee. She subsequently moved
to Florida and while there executed her will and exercised her power of appoint-
ment in the inter vivos trust. Beneficiaries under the will brought suit in
Florida to declare the trust invalid. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, writing for a
majority of five, held that Florida had no jurisdiction over the trustee0 3
The majority relied upon a failure to find a voluntary act between the trustee
and Florida, while Mr. Justice Black, writing for three of the four dissenting
Justices, relied, as he had in McGee, upon the overall reasonableness of having
the matter adjudicated in FloridaP 4
The premise of the majority opinion was that state boundaries are more than
rules laid down in McGee by the majority in Hanson v. Denldla, 357 US. 235 (1958),
would seem to bear out the latter view.
90. The decision rests on an overall finding of reasonableness as opposed to a numerical
listing of contacts between defendant and the forum state. This is abundantly dear because
it was not shown whether the insured mailed his premiums from California.
91. 355 U.S. at 222-23.
92. 357 US. 235 (195S).
93. Id. at 251.
94. Id. at 258-59 (dissenting opinion). Justices Burton and Brennan dissented with
Mr. Justice Black; Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in a separate opinion.
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a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. "They are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States."95
Since the trustee had no office in Florida, transacted no business there, and did
not solicit either in person or by mail in the state, the requisite minimal contacts
were found to be absent. Further, the cause of action was found not to have
arisen out of an act done or consummated in the forum state.90 The nature of the
necessary contact to be "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws . . .,97
Such a restrictive view could hamper the liberalization of jurisdiction which
has developed since International Shoe. It would require a court to look for a
voluntary contact between a nonresident defendant and the forum state to the
exclusion of a general consideration of reasonableness, including the interest
of the forum state in the suit; defendant's knowledge that its acts could
result in forum consequences, hence a suit in the state; and the possibility that
the forum is not inconvenient to the defendant. The rule laid down in Inter-
national Shoe was broader than the interpretation given by the Hanson Court,
since the former stated that due process depended "upon the quality and nature
of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws
which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure," and added that
"that clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment
in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state
has no contacts, ties, or relations."98
The following paragraph of Mr. Justice Stone's International Shoe decision,
on which the Hanson majority relied, stated not that a voluntary contact is
essential but that some contact is necessary. Whereas in Hanson it was deemed
"essential ' 9 that the contact between the defendant and the forum state be
voluntary, in International Shoe it was considered a factor in justifying the
forum state's procedure for gaining jurisdiction over the nonresident
defendant. 0 0
Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Hanson was grounded upon reasonableness as
derived from an analysis of all the factors in the case. He dealt with the interest
of Florida in probating and administering the settlor's will, 1 1 including the
convenience in disposing of this case in Florida, and the settlor's dealings with
the trustee while the settlor was in Florida. In referring to Florida's interest,
he pointed out that the settlor died domiciled in Florida, the legatees were in
Florida, Florida law would probably apply, and multiple suits would be necessary
if Florida's jurisdiction were not upheld. In weighing the burdens imposed on
95. Id. at 251. See note 10 supra.
96. Id. at 251.
97. Id. at 253.
98. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
99. 357 U.S. at 253.
100. 326 U.S. at 319.
101. The dissent cited Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950), as a precedent demonstrating the forum state's great interest in the administration
of its trusts and wills. 357 U.S. at 260-61 (dissenting opinion).
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the parties involved, he concluded that not only could the trustee easily go
to Florida, but that there was some question as to whether the trustee was
an indispensable party under Florida law.
10 2
3. Application of Hanson to Products Liability
There is a conflict as to whether Hanson marks the outer limits of jurisdiction
in all cases, 1 3 or should be confined to its facts.104 In addition, the submission
test of Hanson has been criticized, and rightly so, because it minimized con-
sideration of Florida's interest and the inconvenience to the defendant.@5 The
wiser policy, at least as to product liability actions under single act statutes,CG
would be to adopt an expanded jurisdictional test emphasizing the interest of
the state and the relative convenience of the parties. A strict application of
Hanson, a trust case, to product liability situations would limit the test of
reasonableness where breadth is most needed.
One reason jurisdiction was denied in Hanson even though it had been
upheld in International Shoe Co. v. WJashington,07 Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trzst Co.,10 3 Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp.,O Travelers
Health Ass'n v. Virginia,'" and McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,"' was
the lack of a state statute in Hanson dealing with the type of activity at issue
and the existence of a specific state statute in these other cases. But surely
the presence or absence of a statutory basis for the states' assertion of juris-
diction has no relevance to the constitutional question involved.
The Supreme Court, in upholding jurisdiction, has indicated the importance
of the possibility that an injured plaintiff might become a ward of the forum
state,"= whether or not the plaintiff is a resident of the state.1la Where the
state might have to support the plaintiff in the event he is uncompensated, it
is in the state's interest to make certain that redress is available. Perhaps in
Hanson, Florida's interest was not substantial enough to overcome the tenuous-
102. Id. at 261-62 (dissenting opinion).
103. See Leflar, Conflict of Laws, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 20, 33 (1959).
104. See Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in
Illinois, 1963 U. Ill. L.F. 533.
105. Reese & Galston, Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as a Basis of Judicial
Jurisdiction, 44 Iowa L. Rev. 249, 256-57 (1959). justice Black, in his dissent in Hanon,
criticized the majority for relying on "principles stated the better part of a century ago in
Pennoyer v. Neff .... " 357 U.S. at 259-60 (dissenting opinion).
106. No such products liability case has as yet been decided by the court. See, e.g.,
Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1943), both of
which dealt with obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident defendants in domestic relations
situations.
107. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
103. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
109. 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
110. 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
111. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
112. See, e.g., Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 343 U.S. 66 (1954).
113. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 US. 532, 542 (1935).
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ness of the contacts between the state and the nonresident trustee. In a products
liability situation this would not be the case.
The emphasis which the majority in Hanson placed on voluntary acts by
which the defendant must purposefully avail "itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum state" 114 should not be carried over to a
products liability situation. To require a nonresident to defend in a state where
the plaintiff unilaterally entered and where the defendant neither intended nor
foresaw that he would become involved, would contravene due process not
only as defined in Hanson, but also, barring some overriding state interest, as
defined in McGee." 5 But, where it appears, as in Hanson, that the defendant
has foreseen that he might become involved in another jurisdiction, even though
he never purposefully enters there, the absence of voluntary contact should
not automatically cause jurisdiction to fail." 6
If the limitation which requires a voluntary contact with the state is em-
phasized, such cases as Feathers v. McLucas 1 7 and Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.118 are difficult to justify.1 9 In fact, an argument could be made
that any manufacturer which does not purposefully avail itself of the forum
state would remain judgment proof. °20 The trend of state cases, however, espe-
cially those involving personal injury to residents of the forum state, is to
consider the reasonableness of the defendant's acts in a more general sense,
including such factors as the existence of a state statute designed to provide
a means of redress for its citizens, the hardship of an out-of-state trial to the
plaintiff, the place and nature of the injury, and the nature of defendant's
defective product.' 2' This solution would find a violation of due process only
at the point where trial in the forum state would come completely unexpectedly
to the defendant and inconvenience him to an unreasonable degree.Im
114. 357 U.S. at 253.
115. See cases cited note 206 infra.
116. See Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957), appeal dis-
missed per curiam sub nom. American Fed'n of Musicians of the United States & Canada
v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958), in which jurisdiction was upheld on facts which differed
only slightly from Hanson, perhaps indicating that Hanson should be closely confined to
its facts.
117. 21 App. Div. 2d 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3rd Dep't 1964) (per curiam).
118. 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.V.2d 888 (1960). Compare Mann v. Equitable Gas Co., 209
F. Supp. 571 (N.D. W. Va. 1962).
119. For further discussion of both see text accompanying notes 196-202 infra.
120. See Mueller v. Steelcase Inc., 172 F. Supp. 416, 419 (D. Minn. 1959).
121. See Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963) (interpreting Vermont
law); Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961); Adamek v. Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, 108 N.W.2d 607 (1961); Atkins v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888 (1960); Feathers v. McLucas,
21 App. Div. 2d 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3rd Dep't 1964) (per curiam); Nixon v. Cohn, 62
Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963).
122. See Agrashell Inc. v. Bernard Sirotta Co., 229 F. Supp. 98 (E.D7N.Y. 1964); Tyee
Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Prods. Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 381 P.2d 245 (1963); Lau v.
Chicago & N.W. Ry., 14 Wis. 2d 329, 111 N.V.2d 158 (1961).
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IV. LEGISLATIVE HiSTORY OF NEW YoRK's ToRTIous ACT STATUTE
Products liability cases so often involve out-of-state manufacturers that it
is no surprise that section 302(a)(2) has been frequently used to gain juris-
diction over a manufacturer who sends faulty products into New Yorl:. Two
problems arise in every case: What act is needed to satisfy the statute and
whether there are enough factors present to satisfy the "reasonableness" require-
ment of the due process clause.
A. New York Courts' Failure to E.pand Jurisdiction
Prior to the enactment of CPLR 302 (a) (2), New York courts were loath
to expand their jurisdictional power independently. 12 Justice Breitel, in 1961,
bluntly put this matter up to the legislature: "[U]nfortunately for plaintiff,
there is no statute in this State which extends the jurisdiction of the courts
of this State to an action based upon any contract which may have significant
contacts within the State . . ...- Where a tortious act was committed in
New York and service made, the cause of action was dismissed on the grounds
that defendant was not doing business in the state. But, the same cause of
action was upheld after the enactment of the CPLR.223
B. Aims of CPLR 302: Legislative Intent
By 1958, the Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure 2 had drafted
a single act statute, with a tortious act provision similar to that enacted in
Illinois in 1956. Both statutes contained language alluding to the commission
of "a tortious act within the state." 2 7 The aim of the Illinois statute was to
123. Fremay, Inc. v. Modern Plastic Mach. Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 235, 222 N.Y.S2d
694 (1st Dep't 1961).
124. Id. at 239, 222 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
125. Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 235, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (lst Dep't 1964).
126. Second Preliminary Report 33-39. Research and drafting were under the direction of
Professor Jack B. Weinstein.
127. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 17 (1963) pro-ides:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or
through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits said
person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts
of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of said acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(b) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(c) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situation in this State;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located vAthin this State at the
time of contracting.
Because of the facility with which a newspaper article or a television broadcast may find
its way into the state, although its origin may be far removed, considerations of public
policy prompted the legislature to exclude defamation from the tortious acts which
subject defendants to jurisdiction under this section. See Insull v. World-Telegram Corp.,
273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 US. 942 (1960); cf. New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294 (1964) (Black, J., concurring). However, if the defamation
grows out of the transaction of business in New York, the preceding subdivison would
ensnare the defendant since no exceptions are made for defamation. For example, the
mailing by the author of a libelous article from Spain for publication in a New York
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exploit the expansion of the state's jurisdictional power to the fullest. 128 Similarly,
the stated aim of the New York statute, at its introduction, was to take "full ad-
vantage" of the recent expansion. 129 The word "full" was deleted, however, and
does not appear in the printed notes of the Committee.130 Discussion in the Wein-
stein, Korn and Miller treatise points out that the Advisory Committee's intent
was for New York courts to break away from prior restrictions but to exercise
restraint, especially in products liability cases.' 3 '
1. Application to Corporations
The importance of analyzing the breadth of CPLR 302(a) (2) becomes
obvious when no more than the injury occurs in New York. Suppose a foreign
manufacturer sells defective goods to a retailer outside the state and the goods,
brought into New York for resale, cause injury here. First, does the statute
newspaper was a sufficient transaction of business to support an action against the defendant
for defamation. Totero v. World Telegram Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 594, 245 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Sup.
Ct. 1963). A potential limitation in the draft presented in 1958 was the inclusion of the
words "resulting in physical injury to person or property." Second Preliminary Report 39.
By 1960, this phrase was deleted and the defamation exception added. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 15,
§ 302, p. A-155 (1961) (Final Report of the New York Advisory Committee on PractIce
and Procedure) [hereinafter cited as Final Report]. Whereas the intention of the drafts-
men was to exclude defamation, only the original provision designed to accomplish this could
also have been interpreted to exclude conversion and possibly fraud actions.
Since its enactment, CPLR 302(a) (2) has been applied to torts other than negligence and
breach of warranty. E.g., Kramer v. Vogl, 23 App. Div. 2d 577, 256 N.Y.S.2d 706 (2d
Dep't 1965) (memorandum decision) (denying jurisdiction in a fraud case because no
tortious act was committed within the state; the concurring opinion denying for lack
of minimum contacts); Nexsen v. Ira Haupt & Co., 44 Misc. 2d 629, 254 N.Y.S.2d 637
(Sup. Ct. 1964) (upholding jurisdiction in a conversion action); Lebensfeld v. Tuch, 43
Misc. 2d 919, 252 N.Y.S.2d 594 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (denying jurisdiction for failure to show
agency in a fraud action) ; Platt Corp. v. Platt, 42 Misc. 2d 640, 249 N.Y.S.2d 1 (Sup. Ct.
1964) (upholding jurisdiction in an action for corporate waste). Although an action for
mental distress might have been close under the physical injury requirement, in Its present
form the tortious act section seems to cover it. See Final Report A-155-56.
128. Haas v. Fancher Furniture Co., 156 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. 11. 1957); see Ill. Laws
Reg. Bien. Sess. 1955, at 2245-46; Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, § 17 (1963). For the Supreme
Court's expansion of jurisdiction, see cases cited notes 107-113 supra and accompanying
text.
129. Second Preliminary Report 37; see Weinstein, Korn & Miller, New York Civil
Practice UI 302.01, at 3-29 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Weinstein, Korn & Miller]. In 1960
Professor Weinstein said: "The provisions governing jurisdiction and methods of service
have been drawn with two main objectives: first, to take full advantage of the state's con-
stitutional power to exercise jurisdiction over persons and things, and second, to provide
methods of service that are simple and inexpensive and at the same time best calculated to
give actual notice to a defendant." Weinstein, Proposed Revision of New York Civil Prac-
tice, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 50, 66 (1960).
130. Second Preliminary Report 3941; see Weinstein, Korn & Miller ff 302.01, at 3-29.
131. Id. ff 302.10, at 3-41.
include foreign corporations; 13 and second, was there a tortious act committed
within the state so as to satisfy the statute?
Unquestionably, the use of masculine pronouns and the reference to an
executor or administrator in CPLR 302 (a) do not preclude reference to cor-
porations and, as the court held in Steele v. DeLccrw,1M nondomiciliary "in-
cludes a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in this State .... ",u14
This seems logical, since the statute would be completely emasculated if it
could not be applied to foreign corporations. Corporations are responsible for
the vast majority of the goods shipped into New York and for a great portion
of the economic activity directed into this area.13 5
2. Application to Consequences Within the State
The basic problem in every products liability case has been to ascertain
exactly how much is needed to satisfy the tortious act section. Should the
section be stretched to the fullest extent possible?
If the Law Revision Commission's proposal to amend the Civil Practice Act
had been enacted, there would have been no question. The amendment pro-
vided for jurisdiction over foreign corporations:
[W]here the action ... arises out of any of the follov.ing activities . .. (c) Com-
mission of any act resulting in this state in death or in injury to person or property.
if the corporation expected or should reasonably have expected that the act would
have consequences in this state; (d) Production, manufacture, sale, leasing, dis-
tribution or delivery of goods or furnishing of services, where the goods or services
are used, consumed or resold in this state or received in this state for use, consumption
or resale in this state, and the corporation expected or should reasonably have
expected that they would be so used, consumed, resold or received.136
The proposal clearly indicated that distribution into the state through an out-
132. "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary, or his e.ecutor
or administrator . .. " N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law & R. 302(a). A corporation cannot have an
executor or administrator. Does this reference exclude corporations?
133. 40 Misc. 2d S07, 244 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
134. Id. at SOS, 244 N.Y.S.2d at 99. See Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 231,
288, 200 N.E.2d 427, 431, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433, 438 (1964); Weinstein, Korn & Miller
ff 302.10, at 3-41. The statute also includes defendants who were domicliarie3 at the time
of the commission of the tortious act but who were nondomiciliaries when suit is brought.
O'Connor v. Wells, 43 Misc. 2d 1075, 252 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
135. The statute proposed by the Law Revision Commission (amendment to CPA 229-a)
was, in fact, directed only to foreign corporations. See N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Report,
N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65, p. 85 (1959). A number of states have such statutes, e.g., Minneota-,
Maryland, and Wisconsin. See notes 4S-49 supra. Apparently, the reason this amendment %-as
not enacted was that there was feeling against amending the CPA while the CPLR vas
being drafted, especially since 302 was broader in a number of areas than the Law Revission
Commission proposal (e.g., 302 'as not limited to foreign corporations). See Weinstein,
Korn & Miller E 302.10, at 3-41.
136. N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Report, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65, p. 71 (1959) (Italics
omitted.)
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of-state wholesaler would subject a foreign manufacturer to New York jurisdic-
tion whether the goods were for consumption 137 or resale'3 8 there.
C. The Illinois View of the Tortious Act
The Advisory Committee chose to draft a statute similar to that of Illinois.
In 1958, when the Committee first drafted the statute, there were two principal
cases in Illinois to which the draftsmen could refer when speculating on the
application of a tortious act section. One was Nelson v. Miller,8 9 where the
out-of-state manufacturer had sent an agent into Illinois who injured the
plaintiff while in the state, directly satisfying the criterion of "tortious act
within the state." The other was Hellriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,' 40 in which
the federal district court explained that the negligent act of manufacturing
and failing to properly label a dangerous product (power mower) took place
at the manufacturer's plant in Ohio. The manufacturer's last contact with the
product was in Wisconsin, where it was sold to, and picked up by, the retailer
for resale in Illinois. Only the resale and injury took place in Illinois.141 Chief
Judge Campbell found "that all the acts constituting the alleged tort of de-
fendants . . . occurred outside Illinois" and refused to uphold jurisdiction
since only the injury 142 occurred there.
Nevertheless, by 1961, the Supreme Court of Illinois had decided Gray v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.143 In a fact situation almost
identical with Hellriegel, jurisdiction was upheld on the grounds that "the
statute contemplates the exertion of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
137. See Johnson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 22 App. Div. 2d
138, 254 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1st Dep't 1964) (per curiam).
138. See Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1964),
64 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 14 De Paul L. Rev. 202, 33 Fordham L. Rev. 327, 126 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 138.
139. 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957). See Petterson v. Van Auken, 43 Misc. 2d
162, 250 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
140. 157 F. Supp. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
141. Id. at 721. In McMahon v. Boeing Airplane Co., 199 F. Supp. 908, 909 (N.D.
Ill. 1961), Chief Judge Campbell, in upholding jurisdiction, said: "In Hellriegel v. Scars
Roebuck & Co. . . . I was presented with a similar factual situation and the same legal
issue. In the Hellriegel case the plaintiff alleged his personal injuries were caused by the
defendant's negligent manufacture of a lawn mower in Ohio and Wisconsin. The injury
occurred in Illinois. I was then, as I am now, of the opinion that the words 'tortious act'
as used in Section 17 are not synonymous with the word tort. The former term, more
restrictive than the latter, refers only to the act or conduct and does not include the con-
sequence thereof. I did not then believe, nor do I now believe, that the Illinois Legislature
intended the Illinois Courts to assume jurisdiction over non-resident defendants in cases
such as this." See Anderson v. Penncraft Tool Co., 200 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Ill. 1961), where
the court upheld jurisdiction without Chief Judge Campbell's reluctance.
142. 157 F. Supp. at 721. Accord, Mann v. Equitable Gas Co., 209 F. Supp. 571 (N.D.
W. Va. 1962); see George Monro, Ltd. v. American Cyanamid & Chem. Corp., 1 K.B. 432
(1944).
143. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
to the extent permitted by the due-process dause."' 44 The court relied not
so much upon technicalities in the wording of "commits a tortious act within
the state" as upon the general purpose and effect of the statute. Particular
emphasis was placed upon the fact that "in law the place of a wrong is where
the last event takes place which is necessary to render the actor liable."":;
D. Effect of Illinois Interpretation in New York
The New York Advisory Committee made a change in its proposal in
1960,146 and in 1961 its final report was presented and bills were introduced
for study in both houses of the Legislature. Undoubtedly, a change could have
been made either before enactment of the Committee's proposals or certainly
before the effective date of the CPLR (September 1, 1963) if serious objections
had been raised to the application by Illinois of its own tortious act provision.
No such limitation was placed on the application of the New York statute.
But the Weinstein, Korn and Miller treatise suggests that it is not clear whether
the assertion of jurisdiction in Gray would be found constitutional by the Su-
preme Court.'4 7 The authors then suggest that justification for not following
Gray could also be based upon the ambiguity of the Advisory Committee, on
the subject of manufacturer's liability.145
Professor McLaughlin, however, begins his commentary on section 302 by
stating that "with the enactment of this statute, New York has decided to
exploit the fidlest jurisdictional potential pernissible under federal constitu-
tional restraints." 49 Professor McLaughlin, like the court in Gray, looked to
the spirit of the statute and anticipated many cases where it would be applicable
even though the tortious act actually occurred without the state. The "niagara"
of New York decisions which he anticipated have almost all borne out this
view. 1 o
V. INTEREST OF THE STATE
A. An Applicable Statute in Xc-a York
1. Strict Construction
The state courts had no trouble deciding that CPLR 302 (a) (2) was consti-
tutional' 51 and could be applied retroactively in most cases.' But the New
144. Id. at 436, 176 N.E.2d at 763.
145. Id. at 435, 176 N.E.2d at 762-63. The court cited the Restatement, Conflict of Law
§ 377 (1934). It is interesting to note that although the latest draft gets aw,;ay from the Niew
that the place of injury is the sole factor, the place where the injury occurred is conidred
of more importance than the place where the conduct occurred, Restatement (Second),
Conflict of Laws §§ 379, 379a, ch. 9, Introductory Note at 2 (Tent. Draft No. 9. 1964).
146. Final Report A-156.
147. Weinstein, Korn & Miller ff 302.10, at 3-43.
148. Id. j 302.10, at 3-43-45.
149. McLaughlin, Practice Commentary, McKinney's CPLR 302, at 423. (Emphasis
added.)
150. McLaughlin, Civil Practice, 1963 Survey of N.Y. Law, 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 3M1, 398
(1962).
151. E.g., Totero v. World Telegram Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 594, 245 N.Y.S.2d 370 (Sup.
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York courts were inclined, at least initially, not to follow the reasoning of Gray
in construing the meaning of tortious act. In Feathers v. McLucas,153 the New
York Supreme Court was faced with only an injury in New York when a truck
trailer exploded injuring an onlooker. The trailer was a cargo pressure tank,
manufactured by the defendant Kansas corporation at its plant in Kansas,
and sold in 1956 to a Missouri corporation, which affixed wheels to the trailer.
In 1957 the unit was sold to a Pennsylvania corporation which was in the
business of transporting goods in Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Vermont
Ct. 1963). The court of appeals upheld the constitutionality of CPLR 302 in Simonson V.
International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 200 N.E.2d 427, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1964), and the
Supreme Court cited the Simonson case with approval, specifically referring, also, to CPLR
302(a) in United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 85 S. Ct. 528 (1965). Statutes similar to
CPLR 302 have been declared constitutional by the respective state courts. E.g.,
Nelson v. Miller, 11 fI1. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957); Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543,
99 N.W.2d 670 (1959); Mefi v. Goodman, 69 N.M. 488, 368 P.2d 582 (1962). Even where
the application of a "single act" statute has been held to be unconstitutional, the statute
itself was not so declared. Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502
(4th Cir. 1956); Mann v. Equitable Gas Co., 209 F. Supp. 571 (N). W. Va. 1962).
152. Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281, 200 N.E.2d 427, 251 N.Y.S.2d 433
(1964); Feathers v. McLucas, 41 Misc. 2d 498, 245 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. 1963), rev'd on
other grounds per curiam, 21 App. Div. 2d 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3rd Dep't 1964) ; Steele v.
DeLeeuw, 40 Misc. 2d 807, 244 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1963); see United States v. Montreal
Trust Co., 35 F.R.D. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes &
Reinecke, Inc., 21 App. Div. 2d 474, 251 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1st Dep't 1964); Singer v. Walker,
21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1964); Lewis v. American Archives Ass'n,
43 Misc. 2d 721, 252 N.Y.S.2d 217 (Sup. Ct. 1964); O'Connor v. Wells, 43 Misc. 2d 1075,
252 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Petterson v. Van Auken, 43 Misc. 2d 162, 250 N.Y.S.2d
560 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Developers Small Inv. Corp. v. Puerto Rico Land & Dev. Corp., 42
Misc. 2d 23, 246 N.Y.S.2d 896 (Sup. Ct. 1964); William Rand, Inc. v. Joyas De Fantasia,
S. A., 41 Misc. 2d 838, 246 N.Y.S.2d 778 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Patrick Ellam, Inc. v. Nieves,
41 Misc. 2d 186, 245 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Sup. Ct. 1963). It should be noted that New York law
on the question of whether retroactive application would be constitutional is not entirely
clear. In Simonson, the court of appeals declared: "[W]ith the possible exception of cases in
which the acts serving as the predicate for jurisdiction under the new section are shown to
have been carried out in justifiable reliance on the prior law . . . CPLR 302 has retroactive
effect to the extent of embracing suits instituted after its effective date but based on
previously accrued causes of action." Simonson v. International Bank, supra at 290, 200
N.E.2d at 432, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 440. The New York courts have yet to inform us whether
the "exception" mentioned by the court of appeals is actual rather than merely "possible,"
and, if so, what constitutes an act "carried out in justifiable reliance on the prior law."
Gelfand v. Tanner Motor Tours, Ltd., 339 F.2d 317, 319 n.1 (2d Cir. 1964); United States
v. First Nat'l City Bank, 85 S. Ct. 528, 535 (1965).
153. 41 Misc. 2d 498, 245 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. 1963), rev'd on other grounds per
curiam, 21 App. Div. 2d 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3d Dep't 1964). Accord, Muraco v. Feren-
tino, 42 Misc. 2d 104, 247 N.Y.S.2d 598 (Sup. Ct. 1964). In Muraco, the court did not make
clear whether personal injury or property damage was involved. In the former situation,
jurisdiction would be more likely to be upheld, Feathers v. McLucas, supra, than in the latter,
Frank Angelilli Constr. Co. v. Sullivan & Son, 45 Misc. 2d 171, 256 N.Y.S.2d 189 (Sup. Ct.
1964).
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and other states. In 1962 the trailer exploded while passing through New York
on its way to Vermont with a cargo of propane gas. Suit was brought to recover
for personal injury and property damage. The court reasoned:
If the words "commits a tortious act" are synonmous with the words, "commits a
tort" jurisdiction should be sustained since it is the general rule that "the place of
the wrong is in the State where the last event necessary to make an actor liable for
an alleged tort takes place. .. ." If, however, the words require the presence within
the State of the actor or his agent, the service herein made was ineffective to sub-
ject ... [defendant] to the jurisdiction.154
The court then held that the single act statute requires that the tortious act
rather than the tortious injury must occur in New York before in pcrsonan'
jurisdiction can be obtained, that "tortious act" and "tortious injury" are not
synonymous, and that jurisdiction could therefore not be obtained over the
defendant manufacturer. 1c
2. Liberal Construction
The appellate division reverseda 6 the supreme court, holding that the single
act statute was designed to codify the minimum contacts test of International
Shoe and did not intend to separate "foreign wrongful acts from resulting
forum consequences."'L 7
Admittediy, if the Legislature had used the words "tort in whole or in part"
or "tort," rather than "tortious act," it would have been clearer that an injury
alone within the state would confer jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary, since
a tort occurs at the place of injury.15s Use of the word "tort," however, con-
notes legal liability and, hence, a trial on the merits. The result might have
been unworkable, since a court would have had to determine legal liability
before jurisdiction.Y9 It has been suggestedIcO that this was the reason for
using "tortious act" instead of "tort" in the Illinois statute.
Had the Legislature used the words "tortious injury," the statute would have
154. 41 Misc. 2d at 501, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 235. (Citation omitted.)
155. Id. at 504, 245 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
156. 21 App. Div. 2d 553, 251 N.Y.S.2d 543 (3d Dep't 1964) (per curiam).
157. Id. at 559, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 550.
153. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 377 (1934); see Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 IM. 2d 432, 435, 176 N.E.2d 761, 762-63 (1961).
159. The only determination that must be made in applying the tortious act test is
whether the actor's conduct is of such a nature as to warrant a trial on the merits in the
forum state, not whether the actor will be subject ultimately to tort liability. Nelson v.
Miller, 11 III. 2d 373, 392, 143 N.E.2d 673, 631 (1957). The Supreme Court has declared
that a jurisdictional determination by an appellate court (Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S.
506, 517-18 (1S97)), or even by a trial court from which an appeal might have been but
was not taken, may not be reopened and litigated in any other court, federal or state (see
Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1931)), and has
indicated that such res judicata effect should be extended, as with respect to questions
of the merits, to jurisdictional facts which might have been but were not actually litigated
(e.g., Chicot Count Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 303 U.S. 371, 377-73 (1940)).
160. Comment, 53 Nw. U.L. Rev. 79, 36 (1953).
1965]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
been limited to exclude a situation such as that in Singer v. Walker,101 where
the injury occurred outside New York, but the tortious act (i.e., the circulation
of a mislabelled hammer) occurred within New York.
The lower court's distinction in Feathers between tortious act and tortious
injury is unfortunate. If we assume that there is a need for a statute enabling
New York to protect its citizens in the products liability area,102 and that the
Legislature provided New York courts with a means to expand jurisdiction,
adherence to such a distinction would defeat any attempts to satisfy this
need. In the absence of a specific statement by the Legislature that a non-
domiciliary must commit the negligent act within the state, the courts should
be free to assume jurisdiction where the situation warrants, as it is clearly in
the interest of New York to take jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary who is
responsible for the shipment of faulty products into the state.
Suppose the tortious act section is construed as limited to situations vhere
the conduct of the manufacturer occurs within New York. If a manufacturer
negligently produces goods in this state, the statute will obviously apply. The
manufacturer's tortious conduct was the negligent manufacture in New York.
But suppose the manufacturer is located in New Jersey. If it sends an agent
into New York to deliver goods pursuant to a contract, the manufacturer has
not acted negligently within New York, hence 302 (a) (2) will not apply. An
exception would be where the agent himself is negligent while in this state, 10 3
but this is not the usual products liability situation.
In fact, where the manufacturer of faulty goods is in the state or sends an
agent into the state, it is subject to in personam jurisdiction under the trans-
action of business section, CPLR 302 (a) (1).14 Hence, the construction placed
161. 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1964). The Uniform Interstate
and International Procedure Act uses the phrase tortious injury:
§ 1.03. [Personal Jurisdiction Based upon Conduct].
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an
agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from the person's...
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state if he
regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct,
or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this
state ....
Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act § 1.03 (Supp. 1964). The Commissioners'
Note states that section 1.03(a) (3) is narrower than "tortious act" and "tort in whole or
in part" because some of these statutes have been interpreted to cover acts or omissions
outside the state (citing Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110, § 17(1)(b) (Smith-Hurd 1956); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 12, § 855 (1959)), and that section 1.04 is more restrictive because (citing Gray)
conditions are imposed within the statute before jurisdiction can be taken. Uniform Inter-
state and International Procedure Act § 1.03, Commissioners' Note at 79.
162. Professor Reese's study for the Law Revision Commission would seem to bear this
out. N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Report, N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65, p. 85 (1959).
163. Ellis v. Newton Paper Co., 44 Misc. 2d 134, 253 N.Y.S.2d 47 (Sup. Ct. 1964);
see Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
164. Physical presence in the state is apparently a requisite for jurisdiction under
302 (a) (1). Where the defendant sent an agent to make repairs in New York, pursuant to a
sale consummated in Illinois, jurisdiction was sustained. Viewlex Inc. v. Molon Motor &
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on CPLR 302 (a) (2) by the lower court in Feathers would make the section
superfluous, since 302 (a) (1) would cover tortious acts actually committed
by the nonresident within the state.
The appellate court's construction of 302 (a) (2) in Feathers has prevailed
in the first department "6 5 and in various lower court cases."66 In each case,
however, there remains the problem of construing the statute broadly while
keeping within the bounds of due process.
B. Residence of the Plaintiff
just as the residence of the plaintiff is a factor in determining choice of
law,1 57 it is also an important criterion in determining whether the forum
state can exercise jurisdiction. It does not seem logical that a New York
resident injured in New York should be forced to go to Michigan, for example,
only to have the Michigan court apply New York law, when a New York court
could not only hear its resident's case but apply its own law.
Coil Corp., (Sup. CL) in N.Y.LJ., March 4, 1964, p. 17, col. 7. But where the defendant
never entered the state, New York courts have been reluctant to take jurizdiction under
302(a) (1) even where the business was substantial, Jump v. Duplex Fending [sic] Corp.,
41 Misc. 2d 950, 246 N.Y.S.2d S64 (Sup. Ct. 1964). Both of these cases are of a commercial
nature. In products liability cases involving personal injury, the problem has never been
squarely presented. See Greenberg v. R.S.P. Realty Corp., 22 App. Div. 2d 6M0, 253 N.YSld
344 (2nd Dep't 1964) (memorandum decision) (personal injury action against a Nerw
Jersey resort dismissed for lack of minimum contacts; no agent in New York); Bryant v.
Finnish Natl Airline, 22 App. Div. 2d 16, 253 N.Y.S.2d 215 (lst Dep't 1964) (action
dismissed; unrelated cause of action).
165. Johnson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 22 App. Div. 2d 133,
254 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1st Dep't 1964) (per curiam). As to the second dcpartment compare
Lewin v. Bock Laundry lach. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 599, 249 N.Y.S2d 49 (Sup. Ct., auid
mem. 22 App. Div. 2d 354, 255 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep't 1964), with Kramer v. Vogl, 23 App.
Div. 2d 577, 256 N.Y.S.2d 706 (2d Dep't 1965) (memorandum decision).
166. Additional New York cases which have upheld jurisdiction on the basis of an
injury within and an act without New York under the "tortious act" section are: Rietsch v.
Societe Anonvme des Automobiles Peugeot, 45 Misc. 2d 274, 256 N.Y.S.2d 772 (Sup. Ct.
1965); Moss v. Frost Hempstead Corp., 43 Misc. 2d 357, 251 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup. Ct. 1964);
Lewin v. Bock Laundry Mlach. Co., supra note 165; Fornabaio v. Swisxir Tramrp. Co,
42 Tisc. 2d 1S2, 247 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Sup. CL 1964).
167. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws §§ 379, 379a (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964) provides:
§ 379. The General Principle.
(1) The local law of the state which has the most significant relationhip with the
occurrence and with the parties determines their rights and liabilities in tort.
(2) Important contacts that the forum will consider in determining the state of most sig-
nificant relationship include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct occurred,
(c) the domicil, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
§ 379a. Personal Injuries.
In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless some other state has a more
significant relationship with the occurrence and the parties as to the particular isue involved,
in which event the local law of the latter state will govern."
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In McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,1 8 the United States Supreme Court
reasoned that California's interest in regulating insurance depended upon
protecting its citizens from misconduct in that industry and in seeking redress
where small or moderate claims made suit in a foreign state fruitless.10 0 This
same reasoning can be applied with even greater force to justify a state's
interest in regulating tortious conduct of nonresidents which either occurs
within the forum state or results in injury to its residents. Since the place of
injury is often fortuitious, on the basis of McGee, residence alone may be
considered enough to sustain jurisdiction. This holds true whether the injury
occurs within or without the forum state.' 70 For example, in Singer v. Walker,171
a resident of New York was injured in Connecticut due to the circulation of a
defective and mislabelled hammer in New York. In the absence of an injury
in New York, residency was an important factor in sustaining jurisdiction.
The state's interest could well extend beyond protecting its own residents.
Where a plaintiff could become a public charge in the absence of recompense
for an injury, it is in the forum state's interest to provide proper redress for
his claims. This theory rests upon principles stated thirty years ago by Mr.
Justice Stone in Alaska Packers Ass'n. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n.172
CPLR 302(a) (2), unlike Minnesota's single act tort section, 78 is not
restricted to residents. A nonresident bringing suit in New York, however, will
have to show far stronger reasons why New York courts should sustain juris-
diction. Failure to do so will result in dismissal for reasons quite similar to those
given where forum non conveniens is at issue.174 In fact, given the recent
expansion of jurisdiction, the doctrine of forum non conveniens will have to
become more fully developed to prevent forum shopping and the resultant
frivolous or unfairly burdensome suits against nonresident defendants. 17
C. Hardship to Plaintiff
When a state makes available a means of redress for its citizens, it is also
in the interest of the state to see that remuneration is not lost because expenses
168. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
169. See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643
(1950).
170. Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
171. 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1964).
172. 294 U.S. 532 (1935). "Without a remedy in California, they would be remediless,
and there was the danger that they might become public charges, both matters of grave
public concern to the state." Id. at 542. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S.
220 (1957); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
173. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 303.13(1)(3) (1947). See Williams v. Connolly, 227 F, Supp.
539 (D. Minn. 1964), where jurisdiction in Minnesota was sustained under the transaction
of business section in order to circumvent this restriction.
174. See Gregonis v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 235 N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223
(1923). Jurisdiction was not in issue, but in dealing with a foreign cause of action and a
nonresident defendant, the New York residency of the plaintiff was considered an important
factor in New York's retaining jurisdiction. See also N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 1314.
175. See text accompanying notes 210-12 infra.
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and difficulties deny the plaintiff a fair trial. For example, the prosecution of a
claim in a distant forum could become unduly expensive, as could the multiple
litigation which might be necessary to reach numerous, potentially liable
defendants.
The Supreme Court has spoken of the difficulty of conducting a trial in a
distant forum. "The probability is slight that injured workmen, once returned
to California, would be able to retrace their steps to Alaska, and there suc-
cessfully prosecute their claims for compensation."' 1
In addition, dismissal from a forum with a single act statute and some
contact with multiple defendants, requiring suit in a jurisdiction where neither
contact nor statute exists, would necessitate a series of suits in a number of
states. In Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,17 this was unquestionably the
motivating factor for retaining jurisdiction in Minnesota.
D. Interest in Delendasizt's .Ictivities
1. Breach of Warranty Liability and the Single Act
One area of products liability which has been rapidly expanding is breach
of warranty.'17  Unlike negligence, which is governed by the tort rule that
176. Alaska Packers Ass'n. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 542 (1935). See
Rietsch v. Societe Anonyme des Automobiles Peugeot, 45 'Misc. 2d 274, 256 N.Y.52d 772
(Sup. Ct. 1965), where dismissal would have forced the plaintiff to sue in France.
177. 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mlinn. 1962).
178. At this writing about twenty jurisdictions have classified breach of implied %warranty
as a tort, thereby imposing strict liability upon the seller and/or manufacturer where the
product harms a consumer or user. See, e.g., Arkansas, Ark. Acts 1965, No. 35; California,
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d S97 (1962); Connecticut,
Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 19S, 183 A.2d 8S4 (Super. Ct. 1963); Florida, King v.
Douglas Aircraft Co., 159 So. 2d 103 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), Continental Copper & Stcel
Indus., Inc. v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So. 2d 40 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 195);
Hawaii, Chapman v. Brown, 19S F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961), aftd, .04 F.2d 149 (9th
Cir. 1962); Idaho, Great Am. Ins. Co. v. "Quick-Way" Truck Shovel Co., 204 F. Supp. 847
(D. Colo. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 314 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1963); Iowa, State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 12S9, 110 X.W.2d 449 (1961); Kansas,
B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Michigan, Sppnce v. Three
Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mlich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Minnesota,
Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202 F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962), Beck v. Spindler, 256
Mfinn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959) ; Missouri, Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.\\.2d
41 (Mo. 1963); New Jersey, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 353, 161
A.2d 69 (1960); New York, Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.Zd 432, 191
N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); Oregon, Spada v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 195 F. Supp.
819 (D. Ore. 1961); Vermont, Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963);
Virginia, Va. Code Ann. § 8-6543 (Supp. 1964); Washington, Martin v. J. C. Penney Co.,
50 Wash. 2d 560, 313 P.2d 6S9 (1957); Wyoming, WVyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-2-313 (Supp.
1963) (amending and expanding the Uniform Commercial Code to include all persons
"reasonably expected to use, consume, or be affected by the goods . .. ."); District of
Columbia, Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. Mlun. Ct.
App. 1962). In Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), the
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the law of the place of injury controls' 79 and that the cause of action does not
arise until there has been injury, 80 the breach of warranty occurs and the
cause of action arises at the time of tender of the faulty product. 181 For
section 302 (a) (2) to apply, a tortious act must be alleged. Hence, two questions
must be answered before jurisdiction can be sustained: first, is there a tortious
act committed when a warranty is breached; and, second, if there is, does the
actionable consequence occur within the state?
Let us assume a faulty out-of-state manufacture, a sale to a New York
retailer, purchase by a resident of New York and injury therein. In New York,
breach of warranty is considered a tort. 82 Variously labelled "strict liability,"
18
"special liability of seller of product to user or consumer,"' 84 and "breach of
warranty," 85 this hybrid cause of action sounds in tort to the extent that a
user or a consumer who sues the manufacturer or seller need not be in privilty
with the defendant. 8 6
The trend of judicial opinion in various jurisdictions has been that the
breach of an implied warranty of fitness is actionable without privity, because
it is a tortious wrong upon which suit may be brought by a non-contracting
party.'8 7 The action for breach of warranty was originally only for breach
of express warranty, sounding in tort and closely related to deceit. It was not
until after the writ of assumpsit was created that an action for breach of
implied warranty was recognized. Implied warranty was then classified as a
contract cause of action. 8 8 With the recent trend toward sustaining breach of
implied warranty without an underlying contract (i.e., eliminating the privity
requirement), the nature of the cause of action has shifted from one of contract
to one of tort.
189
court gave this construction to the Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46
U.S.C. § 761 (1958).
179. Restatement, Conflict of Laws, § 377 (1934). But see Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) (place of injury merely one con-
sideration); Restatement (Second), Conflict of Laws §§ 379, 379a (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1964) (place of injury of primary importance but not sole consideration).
180. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
181. New York Uniform Commercial Code § 2-725.
182. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
183. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900 (1962).
184. Restatement (Second), Torts § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
185. Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436, 191 N.E.2d 81,
82, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594 (1963).
186. See authorities cited note 178 supra.
187. See Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 288, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216, 220 (1st Dep't
1964). Justice Breitel also stated that a mere breach of warranty in itself constitutes a tort.
See also Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240
N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5,
181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962). The trend noted in Goldberg is evidenced by
the cases cited note 178 supra.
188. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale
L.J. 1099, 1126-27 (1960).
189. See authorities cited note 178 supra.
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If breach of warranty is sufficiently tortious to abolish privity, it would be
inconsistent not to consider the manufacturer of a faulty item a tort-feasor,
hence one who has committed a tortious act. As to the immediate buyer a
cause of action against the manufacturer occurs upon tender of the faulty
product; it is then that the breach occurs. The ultimate user or consumer,
however, has no cause of action until injury because he has made no contract
with the manufacturer. As in tort, the wrong as to a third party actually occurs
upon injury.'2 0 Thus the tortious consequence of a nonresident's faulty mnanu-
facture as to a remote user occurs not at the place of tender to a wholesaler or
retailer but at the place of injury.' 1 Moreover, jurisdiction should not be made
to depend upon the theory of action pleaded. The result should be the same in
both negligence and warranty actions since the jurisdictional test does not rest
upon the merits of the plaintiff's case,'2 - but rather on the defendant's contact
with the state. It is as much in the state's interest to control the introduction
of defectively manufactured goods into the state as it is to control the
introduction of negligently manufactured products. 23
2. Nature of the Injury
New York courts have been quite consistent in upholding jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants served under CPLR 302(a)(2) where personal injury
to residents was involved and in denying it where the injury has been to
property.194 The statute itself is broad enough to include actions involving
190. An inconsistency would arise if the contract statute of limitations were to be
applied to breach of warranty cases, since the injured party's right to bring the action
would not rise until injury. See Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140 111
N.E.2d 421 (1953).
191. See Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); Beck v. Spindler,
256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670 (1959); Rietsch v. Societe Anonyme des Automobiles
Peugeot, 45 Misc. 2d 274, 256 N.Y.S.2d 772 (Sup. Ct. 1965). In determining choice of law
in a breach of warranty action, see Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d S63 (7th Cir. 19C0),
where the court applied the law of the state of the injury.
192. See Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
193. Where third parties are impleaded, whether on a theory of negligence or breach
of implied warranty, precisely the same results should follow. It is to be expected that,
through the utilization of impleader, defendants will be able to avoid being forced into
multiple suits to recover from their indemnitor (a common situation even where "vouching
in" is used). One action should now be sufficient to determine ultimate varranty liability
except in rare cases in which the indemnitor's connection with the forum state is totally
unforeseeable.
Where indemnification is based upon a contract, it is unclear whether the indemnitee's
liability on the main claim is sufficient nexus for jurisdiction over the indemnitor without
an independent predicate upon which the forum state can rely. The majority's opinion in
Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 34S U.S. 66 (1954), couched as it is in
terms of state interest (injury to a domiciliary within the forum state) and convenience
of the defendant, indicates that no such independent predicate is required. If state in-
terest and convenience are sufficient grounds to override a contract, why should they not
be sufficient grounds upon which to base jurisdiction?
194. In Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (Ist Dep't 1964),
Justice Breitel distinguished Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Ills, Inc, 239 F.2d
502 (4th Cir. 1956), on this point. Compare cases cited in notes 165-66 supra (all in-
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damage to property as well as personal injury, but the state's interest in
providing a forum for plaintiffs who have suffered personal injury has been
considered greater than providing a forum for plaintiffs who have only suffered
property damage.
If, however, through faulty manufacture, a propane tank explodes, as in
Feathers v. McLucas,195 resulting only in extensive property damage, perhaps
the distinction would prove ill founded. Certainly every reason the state has
to control activity which results in personal injury would exist, and, further,
a damaged plaintiff who was not compensated and had no other personal re-
sources would become a charge of the state as surely as if he were in a state
hospital. The Supreme Court in McGee allowed California to extend its juris-
diction to provide redress for a claimant who was unable to collect as the
beneficiary of decedent's insurance policy. The claim involved was merely
monetary, not for any physical injury, personal or property. Hence, the
distinction made by the New York courts would not seem to be a substantial
reason for denying jurisdiction. 196
Another distinction upon which New York courts have relied is the inherently
dangerous nature of the product involved. In Feathers, it was a defective
propane tank, and in Singer v. Walker,OT a defective and mislabelled hammer.
The distinction between products which are inherently dangerous and those
which are not has become ludicrous.198 It hardly seems to be a valid criterion
upon which to rest jurisdiction. A sounder approach would be an examination
of the result which the defective instrumentality causes in the state and an
assessment of the state's interest in protecting its citizens from such effects.
VI. FORESEEABILITY BY THE DEFENDANT
A. Industrial
1. Purposeful Availment
In Feathers v. McLucas, 9 9 the defendant corporation sold its tank to the
Missouri assembler and the assembler sold the trailer to a Pennsylvania trucker.
volving personal injury), with the following cases (involving property damage) in which
jurisdiction was denied: Frank Angelilli Constr. Co. v. Sullivan & Son, 45 Misc. 2d
171, 256 N.Y.S.2d 189 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Muraco v. Ferentino, 42 Misc. 2d 104, 247 N.Y.S.2d
598 (Sup. Ct. 1964). See also Arms v. Glassman, 23 App. Div. 2d 492, 255 N.Y.S.2d 891
(1st Dep't 1965) (memorandum decision) (denying jurisdiction for lack of either minimal
contacts or contemplation of use in the forum).
195. 21 App. Div. 2d 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3d Dep't 1964) (per curiam).
196. The statute extends beyond physical, to commercial damage. To deny jurisdiction
based on the absence of physical harm seems to be an inflexibly narrow construction.
See Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956).
197. 21 App. Div. 2d 285, 250 N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1964). See also 33 Fordham L.
Rev. 327, 335 (1964).
198. Compare Singer v. Walker, supra note 197, in which a hammer was said to be
a dangerous instrumentality, with Pendzimas v. Eastern Metal Prods. Corp., 218 F. Supp.
524 (D. Minn. 1961), in which an electric frying pan was held not to be a dangerous
instrumentality.
199. 21 App. Div. 2d 558, 251 N.Y.S.2d 548 (3d Dep't 1964) (per curiam).
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The tank exploded while the truck was being driven through New York. The
court held that the contacts required by International Shoe were met as the
manufacturer had reason to foresee that the Pennsvlvania trucker would use
this tank in the New York area and, hence, faulty construction by the manu-
facturer could have disastrous effects in New York.2-30
Under the Hanson test, requiring purposeful availment of the benefits and
protection of the laws of the forum state before jurisdiction can be obtained
over a nonresident, the appellate division's decision in Fca!lcrs would have to be
reversed.2 "1 The "essential" contact required in Hanson is clearly absent.
The Feathers court, however, applying a test of foreseeability, found the
requisite minimum contacts:
The record demonstrates that it [the corporation] had knorledge that the instant
tank was constructed for its ultimate consignee, a Pennsylvania domiciliary, and was
intended for use in interstate commerce. In these times of modem transportation it
is a fair inference that respondent. despite a lack of precise knowledge of the range
and extent of ... [the trucker's] activities, could be expected reasonably to foresee
that its acts, if wrongful, might well have potential consequences in adjoining New
York.202
Hanson is not mentioned in the decision. Hanson was a trust case. The
interest of Florida in that case was not based on personal injury to Florida
residents. The requisite minimum contacts in a personal injury action should
be more flexible to enable the forum state to stress reasonableness in acquiring
jurisdiction. The Hanson "purposefully avails itself" test places too much
stress on requisite contact and too little on a general appraisal of the interest of
the forum and foreseeability. - 3 To extend the Hanson test into the products
liability field would be an unfortunate regression into strict nineteenth century
concepts of jurisdiction.
2. Foreseeability
The test of foreseeability has been applied in a number of cases where products
for commercial use, distributed beyond the borders of the manufacturer's state,
caused injury to a resident of the forum. In New York, jurisdiction has been
exercised over nonresident manufacturers, who have not shipped directly into
the state, on the grounds that the defendant had foreseen that his product
could be used in the state,2 0 4 even where the court strived to find substantial
200. Id. at 560, 251 N.Y.S.2d at 551.
201. Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 25S Mlinn. 511, 104 N.XW.2d 33 (1960),
would also have to be reversed.
202. 21 App. Div. 2d at 560, 251 N..S.2d at 551. (Emphasis added.)
203. Cf. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Watson v. Em-
ployers Liab. Assur. Corp., 34S U.S. 66 (1954). Factors such as the nature of the de-
fendant's activity and the injury it caused are essential elements in the appraizal of reason-
ableness as defined in International Shoe. See Singer v. Walker, 21 App. Div. 2d 235, 250
N.Y.S.2d 216 (1st Dep't 1964).
204. Feathers v. McLucas, 21 App. Div. 2d 553, 560, 251 N.Y.S.2d 543, 551 (3d Dep't
1964) (per curiam); Lewin v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 42 Misc. 2d 599, 249 N.Y.S.2d 49
(Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem. 22 App. Div. 2d S54, 255 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dep't 1964).
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contacts.20 5 This same test has been applied in numerous out-of-state cases. 200
If defendant can be shown to have foreseen that his defective manufacture
could result in serious forum consequences, it is not unreasonable to hold him
for trial in that state. But there are limits in applying a test of foreseeability.
For example, if in Feathers the defendant sold its tank to the Missouri as-
sembler and the assembler dealt only with California truckers, the defendant
would not expect involvement with New York. But suppose the assembler
had sold to a national trucking company. Should it not then be subject to
suit anywhere in the country? Quite probably it would not surprise the manu-
facturer to be sued in a remote state under these circumstances, and there
would be less of a problem with foreseeability.
B. Consumer
1. Purposeful Availment
The most popular application of the tortious act provision has been, and
will undoubtedly continue to be, in the ordinary situation where the goods
pass from manufacturer to wholesaler to retailer to consumer. If the manu-
facturer is out of state and the wholesaler and retailer are in the forum state,
the defendant can be said to have voluntarily entered the state, for he shipped
directly into the jurisdiction. The test of purposeful availment would be an
adequate yardstick with which to determine reasonableness.
At the other extreme, where a New York purchaser buys a stove and then
moves to New Mexico, suit under New Mexico's single act statute would be
a consequence of plaintiff's unilateral action of moving to New Mexico. Under
Hanson, or even McGee, since the manufacturer neither availed itself of the
benefits of the New Mexico market nor foresaw involvement there, suit in New
Mexico is unreasonable.
2. Foreseeability
More difficult situations lie somewhere between the two extremes described
above. Suppose a New York resident purchases by mail order from a Chicago
mail-order house. The resident has received goods into the state, but he also
sought to make the purchase out of the state. A close investigation of reasonable-
ness, which should go beyond whether the defendant purposefully availed
himself of the New York market, would be required. Perhaps the national
mail-order house could be deemed to have purposefully availed itself of a na-
tional market. The better test, however, would be foreseeability, which permits
consideration of such factors as the extent of interstate advertising and
solicitation.2 0 7
205. Johnson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y of the United States, 22 App. Div. 2d 138,
254 N.Y.S.2d 258 (1st Dep't 1964) (per curiam).
206. See, e.g., Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 258 Minn. 511, 104 N.W.2d 888
(1960); Nixon v. Cohn, 62 Wash. 2d 987, 385 P.2d 305 (1963).
207. See Adamek v. Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, 108 N.W.2d 607 (1961), in which
jurisdiction was upheld under the Minnesota single act statute ("tort whole or In part")
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Where the marketing process involves various out-of-state intermediaries,
the test in Hanson fails completely. For example, if a Wisconsin manufacturer
sells a stove to a New Jersey wholesaler, who in turn sells the stove to Macy's
in New York, and Macy's sells the stove to a New York resident who brings
a negligence suit against the nonresident manufacturer when the stove
explodes, the defendant could not seriously claim that it did not foresce use of
its product in New York. The manufacturer did not voluntarily enter the state.
It shipped its product to another state, New Jersey. But it certainly placed
its product into a stream of commerce directed toward New Yorl:. Thus, the
manufacturer foresaw that its product would enter the New York market; it is
reasonable to epect it to defend against a "stay-at-home" purchaser93°
If a New York buyer were to go to Newark to buy his stove, without
revealing that he was a New Yorker, the situation might favor dismissal in
New York. It might well depend on whether the seller aimed solely at a local
market. The buyer went out of state to purchase. Why should he not return
there to sue? On the other hand, if a Connecticut resident were to come to
New York to buy from a large store like Macy's, which can probably point to
a tri-state market, it is not unforeseeable that its goods might cause injury
out of state, and hence, suit in Connecticut would be reasonable. One distinction
is whether the seller is catering to a market local or interstate in character. -
in precisely such a situation. Compare W. H. Elliott & Sons Co. v. Nuodex Prods. Co.,
243 F.2d 116 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 323 (1957), with Dowd v. Boro Drug3,
Inc., 70 NJ. Super. 48S, 176 A.2d 13 (Super. Ct. 1961), in which jurisdiction %as denied.
203. See Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); Anderon v. Penn-
craft Tool Co., 200 F. Supp. 145 (N.D. Ill. 1961); Gray v. American Radhtor &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.W.2d 761 (1961); Ehlers v. United States
Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 124 N.W.2d 324 (Blinn. 1963); BeDl: v. Spindler, 256 Blinn.
543, 99 NW.2d 670 (1959); Rietsch v. Societe Anonyme des Automobiles Peugcot, 45
Misc. 2d 274, 256 N.Y.S.2d 772 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Shepard v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 249 NC.
454, 105 S.E.2d 704 (1959); Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Ex-
tended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. Ill. L.F. 533, 547. Contra, Pendzimas v. Eastern
Metal Prods. Corp., 213 F. Supp. 524 (D. Blinn. 1961); Mueller v. Steelcase, Inc., 172
F. Supp. 416 (D. Minn. 1959); Hellriegel v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 157 F. Supp. 713 (N.D.
Ill. 1957); O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 56S (1963). Where
an interstate manufacturer enters no foreign state, but distributes through intermediarife,
one of which is in the forum state, agency has Eometims been found betw~cn the in-
termediary and the manufacturer as a device for gaining jursdiction. Sep, e.g, Florio v.
Powder Power Tool Corp., 248 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1957); Kahn v. Maico Co., 216 F2d
233 (4th Cir. 1954). This is a roundabout approach which a test of forezeeability would
eliminate. See, e.g., Reitsch v. Societe Anonyme des Automobiles Peugeot, supra,
209. See Developments in the Law: State-Court Juridiction, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 901,
92S-30 (1960). Contra, O'Brien v. Comstock Foods, 123 Vt. 461, 194 A.2d 563 11963),
which denied jurisdiction although defendants' marketing could have been termed "inter-
state in character." Apparently many heretofore "local" businesses can be considered
interstate in character. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). The test of
foreseeability thus broadens with judicial recognition that modem marketing methods
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Thus, the test of foreseeability involves more than either a numerical addition
of contacts or the finding of an act directed to the forum state. It is a flexible
standard depending upon a finding of reasonableness. It goes beyond a require-
ment of conscious availment to a consideration of whether the defendant could
anticipate injury in the forum state in the event that his products were faulty.
VII. SHOULD THE COURT EXERCISE JURISDICTION?
A. Forum Non Conveniens
Traditionally, forum non conveniens is applied only after a state has obtained
jurisdiction over the parties. The same factors, however, could be relevant
where more than one state has a strong interest in a products liability case, and
defendant has foreseen possible consequences in all the states involved. Flex-
ibility in assessing the situation is essential, and the final decision might well
rest upon a determination of the relative convenience of the possible forums.210
In Gzlf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,211 various tests were enumerated, such as "rela-
tive ease of access to sources of proof"; availability of compulsory process
for, and the cost of obtaining the attendance of, witnesses; enforcibility of
a judgment; possibility of a fair trial; congestion of the court; and the ability
to implead other parties necessary for a just disposition of the matter.2 12 A
consideration of these factors prior to a grant of jurisdiction under a tortious
act provision might well provide a means to limit its unnecessary exercise.213
B. Unfair Burden Upon Defendant
Judge Sobeloff, in Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc.,2 14 sug-
gested an example where a tire dealer in California sold defective tires to a
Pennsylvania resident who was on vacation in California. Would the dealer
be considered on notice as to a possible suit in Pennsylvania because the buyer's
license plates showed he was a Pennsylvania resident? The point does not
seem to be that the garageman's contacts with Pennsylvania were too tenuous,
but that his business was of a purely local nature. Thus, though foreseeability
existed, consideration of the nature of the garageman's business might make
more often than not are interstate in character, even in small businesses. In determining
jurisdiction there is no reason why a broad view could not be adopted.
210. See Blout v. Peerless Chems. (P.R.) Inc., 316 F.2d 695, 700 n.5 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 831 (1963); Dowd v. Boro Drugs Inc., 70 N.J. Super. 488, 505-06, 176
A.2d 13, 23 (Super. Ct. 1961); Lau v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 14 Wisc. 2d 329, 335, Ill
N.W.2d 158, 162 (1961).
211. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
212. Id. at 508. See 37-43 Chanango St. Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 6 Misc.
2d 788, 162 N.Y.S.2d 802 (Munic. Ct. N.Y. 1957); Developments of the Law: State-
Court Jurisdiction, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 1010-11 (1960).
213. See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Texas L. Rev. 657 (1959).
214. 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956). For a restrictive view see Sobeloff, Jurisdiction
of State Courts Over Non-Residents in Our Federal System, 43 Cornell L.Q. 196 (1957).
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